De quantitate animae: The measure of the soul; Latin text, with English translation and notes by Augustine of Hippo; 1 edition; First published in. PDF | Augustine is commonly interpreted as endorsing an extramission theory of perception in De quantitate animae. A close examination of the text shows. DE QUANTITATE ANIMAE LIBER UNUS S. Aurelii Augustini OPERA OMNIA – editio latina > PL 32 > De Quantitate Animae liber unus.
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According the negative argument, just because the soul lacks extension does not mean that it is not real De quantitate animae 3. Plausibly though it may be, the principle—to see, one must look—is a sub- stantive claim that not all may endorse.
It is only when the outer-directed activity of the perceiver that constitutes, at least in part, their perception of the object is conceived as something spatially extending to the distal object so that it is in contact with that object do we get a genuine commitment to extramission.
For consider a ray sent from a single eye.
naimae Geometricians draw cones which are formed from the intersection of the rays sent out through the eyes. In effect, Augustine is argu- ing that the soul possesses greater virtual magnitude than any extended corporeal thing.
Justice lacks length, width, and height. Its slogan might be: On the latter understanding, the object of sen- sory awareness is external, at least if we rule out cases of auto-affection—it is what affects the body from without.
Swartz, editor, Perceiving, Sensing, quaantitate Knowing, pages 29— If one perceives, one is acted upon. Shall I say that the eyes [are affected] where they are? Agostino, volgarizzate giusta la edizione de’ PP.
It at best characterizes a form of inte- roceptive awareness. Moreover, and importantly, justice is greater in value than the tree. The illuminated me- dia intervening between the perceiver and the distant object of perception already, qquantitate to Aristotle, constitutes a continuous unity De anima 2.
There it encounters what is like it, external light. Like the stick, the visual ray is a continuous unity that spatially extends from the perceiver to the object perceived.
Find in a library. Francisco Suarez Quantitte una cum questionibus in libros Aristotelis de anima 3. If souls are inextended, if they lack extensive magnitude, then they are incorporeal.
The stick analogy captures the formal features of the Timaeus account, namely, that the compound of emitted light and external light constitutes a continuous, rectilin- ear, unity—just like a straight stick.
The outward activity of looking and seeing is not the exclusive provenance of the extramission theory. Light is emitted outward from its source upon the scene that it illuminates.
Why describe the object of sensory awareness as something that is not hidden from the soul? At any rate, such accounts not only involve extramissive elements but intromissive elements as well. Perception and Extramission in De quantitate animae. It is the greatness of the soul that establishes its inextended, and hence, incorporeal nature. Go to Public Collections to browse other people’s collections. The objects of vision, for example, are external bodies located at a distance from the perceiver.
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Catalog Record: De quantitate animae; The measure of the | Hathi Trust Digital Library
Reprinted in Broad Augustine explains occlusion as the obstruction of visual rays. Sed, quemadmodum si virga te tangerem, ego utique tangerem, quanttate sentirem, neque tamen ego ibi essem ubi te tangerem. One may accept the principle that to see, one must look, and yet deny that looking constitutes, even in part, seeing. It is not an unambiguous statement of the ex- tramission theory. Notice that Augustine, after having introduced the extramissionist imagery of rays, immediately brackets that commitment, claiming that it is treated subtly and ob- scurely and claims that the explanation of perceptual discernment by rays has not yet been clearly demonstrated.
Augustine understands corporeal light as the image, in the Pla- tonic sense, of the true spiritual light. Extramission theories are motivated by an apparent need to be in contact with distant sense objects if the perceiver is to be aware of them. So it is the soul that acts in seeing and so places itself in the distal body seen Colleran, n. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, So the perceiver sees an object where they are not. If two objects, one near—a man—and one far—a column—are visible to the perceiver, in the circumstances of perception and hence the man no longer occludes the columnthen it is not the case that the visual rays reach the near object sooner than the far: So understood, the object of sensory awareness is a bodily affection, the way in which the body is affected.
Quanhitate mind may apprehend itself in thought in the way that animaee power of sight acting through the eye could not apprehend itself in vision. But, if that were true, sight would not be rated higher than the other senses. For they say that the eyes send out rays, the right eye to the left, the left eye to the right, and as a result a cone snimae formed by their intersection, which is why sight that can encompass many visible things all at once, but sees exactly only those parts where the rays intersect.
This has the consequence that the emitted light cannot be distinguished from the external light and so is not directly observable. Moreover, just as illumination manifests the latent visibility of an object, seeing an illuminated object manifests its latent presence to the perceiver revealing it to be where it is.
It thus possesses a power that no corpo- real qiantitate may have. The magnitude of the soul De quantitate animae. I do not know what to answer and I do not know where I am. And yet it falls short of the extramission theory. What you see, after all, is what you touch with the ray from your eye.